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Abstract	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  This	  thesis	  investigates	  the	  influence	  of	  economic	  conditions	  on	  parental	  attitudes	  and	  
student	  performance	  using	  PISA	  and	  OECD	  data.	  In	  2014,	  Matthias	  Doepke	  and	  Fabrizio	  Zilibotti	  
published	  a	  paper	  theorizing	  that	  parenting	  styles	  emerge	  as	  equilibrium	  outcomes	  depending	  
on	  both	  parental	  preferences	  and	  the	  economic	  environment	  (Doepke	  and	  Zilibotti,	  2014).	  
Their	  theory	  states	  that	  parents	  adopt	  more	  involved	  and	  overbearing	  parenting	  styles	  as	  the	  
economic	  returns	  to	  student	  achievement	  rise.	  This	  thesis	  empirically	  tests	  Doepke	  and	  
Zilibotti’s	  theory	  using	  the	  triennial	  PISA	  survey,	  and	  it	  further	  tests	  whether	  parenting	  styles	  
directly	  influence	  student	  performance	  in	  math,	  science,	  and	  reading.	  My	  results	  support	  
Doepke	  and	  Zilibotti’s	  theory	  by	  finding	  a	  positive	  relationship	  between	  the	  Wage	  Premium	  and	  
Parental	  Dissatisfaction.	  I	  also	  find	  a	  negative	  relationship	  between	  Parental	  Dissatisfaction	  and	  
Student	  Performance	  and	  a	  mixed	  relationship	  between	  the	  Wage	  Premium	  and	  Student	  
Performance.	  The	  contribution	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  empirical	  support	  for	  Doepke	  and	  Zilibotti’s	  
theory	  and	  a	  creative	  and	  novel	  use	  of	  the	  PISA	  data.	  
Keywords:	  Education,	  Parenting,	  Wage	  Premium,	  Student	  Achievement,	  PISA	  Survey	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1. Introduction	  
	  
Beginning in the mid-1990s, international educational assessments have enabled economists 
to conduct between-country studies to better understand what causes international variation in 
student achievement. The most noteworthy of these assessments is the PISA (Programme for 
International Student Assessment), which collects extensive student background data in addition 
to standardized math, science, and reading examinations. Participating countries can also opt into 
the Optional Parental Questionnaire, which surveys parents about their attitudes towards their 
child’s school and the amount of money they invest in their child’s education. This survey is 
useful for understanding the impact of parental behavior on the educational process but has thus 
far been underutilized by researchers. 
In 2014, Matthias Doepke and Fabrizio Zilibotti published a paper titled “Parenting with 
Style” (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2014), which theorizes that parents choose their parenting 
strategies partly in response to economic conditions. The authors argue that “helicopter 
parenting” (i.e. a strict, overbearing parenting style) incurs economic costs on the parents (e.g. 
time, money) and that the returns to student achievement must be sufficiently high for a parent to 
choose to incur these costs. In other words, the benefits of “helicopter parenting” must outweigh 
the costs in order for such parenting styles to prevail. The authors predict that countries in which 
the economic returns to student achievement are large will also have large proportions of 
“helicopter parents” since parents in such countries have greater incentive to actively encourage 
their children’s education. Their theory was publicized in the New York Times (Giridharadas, 
2014) and Chicago Magazine (Moser, 2014) among other places, and it reinvigorated the public 
discourse over parenting styles. 
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This thesis empirically tests Doepke and Zilibotti’s theory using PISA data, and it further 
tests whether parental attitudes influence student performance on standardized examinations. 
Three iterations of the PISA survey are combined with macroeconomic variables from the 
OECD to create a large sample of students from countries with varying degrees of economic 
inequality. The PISA background surveys allow me to control for student, family, school, and 
economic characteristics in order to limit the effect of omitted variables in the analysis. In simple 
terms, this study tests whether parents rate their child’s school more severely when the economic 
returns to student achievement are higher, and it additionally examines the effects of the 
economic returns to education and parental attitudes on student achievement. This study is 
unique because it uses items from the PISA Parental Questionnaire as outcome variables instead 
of explanatory variables and it combines multiple iterations of the PISA survey into a single 
dataset. My thesis contributes to the growing bodies of economic research on international 
education and parental behavior as well as the public discourse over which parenting style is 
most effective.   
	  
2.  Literature Review 
In 2011, Amy Chua released her controversial book Battle Hymn of the Tiger Mother where 
she argues that the traditional Chinese method of strict, authoritarian child rearing is superior to 
the more nurturing and permissive styles of the West (Chua, 2011a). Her book sparked a 
vigorous public discussion after it was publicized in the Wall Street Journal (Chua, 2011b), but 
her concept of the “Tiger Mom” is not limited to China. For example, Japan coined the 
pejorative term “Kyoiku mama” to describe a mother that relentlessly forces her children to 
study (Lebra, 1985). The overbearing Asian parent is a common stereotype even within the 
United States, and Asian students are generally regarded as dedicated and high achieving. 
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Clearly parenting styles are influenced by cultural factors, but the question remains whether Amy 
Chua’s style of authoritarian parenting is economically rational. 
Diana Baumrind originally laid the foundation for parenting research by determining three 
broad parenting styles: permissive, authoritarian, and authoritative (Baumrind, 1966). Further 
research has determined a fourth category: neglectful parenting (Aunola, Stattin, & Nurmi, 
2000). Not only do these differing styles influence student achievement, they have been shown to 
influence self-esteem, health, and risky behavior among other things. For example, permissive 
parenting was shown to correlate positively with risky behavior (Chan & Koo, 2011). One 
explanation for the prevalence of authoritative parenting in Asian cultures is the idea that strong 
cognitive abilities leads to preferable labor market outcomes. Authoritative parenting has indeed 
been shown to correlate positively with grade point average and school engagement (Darling & 
Steinberg, 1993). However, further research has shown that non-cognitive abilities (e.g. social 
skills) are equally if not more important than cognitive abilities (Heckman, Stixrud, & Urzua, 
2006), so an authoritarian parenting style may be effective only to the extent that it emphasizes 
both cognitive and non-cognitive abilities. 
One of the most heavily discussed aspects of parenting is the use of discipline and corporal 
punishment. In a 1999 study, researchers found that 94% of American 3-4 year olds received 
corporal punishment at some point (in the form of hitting and spanking), and this number slowly 
diminishes throughout childhood. This is in spite of a growing body of psychological research 
emphasizing the negative aspects of corporal punishment and negative reinforcement (Straus & 
Stewart, 1999). For example, violence rates diminished considerably after corporal punishment 
was banned in Europe (Bussmann, Erthal, & Schroth, 2011). Nevertheless, many parents 
	   5	  
throughout the world still prefer the stick to the carrot when disciplining their children and 
corporal punishment is generally associated strict parenting styles. 
Another stream of parental research analyses the effect of the parents’ occupation, social 
standing, and the environment on their children’s upbringing. Research shows that wealthier 
parents are better able to provide pecuniary incentives to their children, and in the absence of 
such incentives, poor parents are forced to resort to more authoritarian methods (Weinberg, 
2001). This may partially explain the prevalence of corporal punishment in the Southern United 
States (Straus & Stewart, 1999). It also emphasizes the need to control for socioeconomic status 
in education analyses. 
Although parents clearly influence the academic success of their children, many other factors 
influence student achievement. Chiefly among them are school resource endowments and 
institutional factors of the education system (Fuchs & Woessmann, 2004). In order to analyze the 
relationship between parenting styles and student achievement, it is helpful to control for these 
other factors. Thankfully, the PISA survey makes this feasible.  
The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is an international assessment 
conducted triennially by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
Its purpose is to evaluate education systems worldwide by testing the knowledge of 15-year-old 
students. The PISA and other such international surveys have been incredibly fruitful for 
researchers, and Eric Hanushek and Ludger Woessmann (2014) offer a thorough analysis of the 
current state of international educational research. Much of the existing literature focuses on 
creating educational production functions that account for as much of the variance in student 
performance as possible both between and within countries (e.g. Fuchs & Woessman, 2004; 
Woessman, Luedermann, Schuetz, & West, 2007). The latter study was able to account for 87% 
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of the variance in student performance at the country level and 39% of the variance at the student 
level. Other attempts at estimating production functions have yielded similar results.  
Although a full analysis of international education is beyond the scope of this review, several 
important findings are worth noting. Curriculum based external exit exams (CBEEEs) have been 
demonstrated to significantly affect student performance (Bishop, 1997) and to interact with 
institutional factors such as standardized testing and school autonomy (Fuchs & Woessman, 
2004). CBEEEs affect the incentives of actors in the education system (e.g. teachers) by holding 
them accountable to an external standard. This minimizes the negative effect of opportunistic 
behavior and maximizes the positive gains from localized knowledge leads (i.e. teachers 
knowing best how to influence their particular students). Another important finding is that 
educational tracking (i.e. separating students into different school types on the basis of exam 
scores) has significant effects on educational inequality, especially when the tracking is 
conducted early in the educational cycle (Hanushek, 2006). Since achievement is strongly 
correlated with family characteristics and peer effects in the early schooling years (Schuetz, 
Ursprung, & Woessmann, 2008), these effects are exacerbated for students tracked into low-
achieving schools at a young age. Overall, these findings emphasize the need to control for a 
variety of factors when analyzing the relationship between parenting and student achievement. 
Another stream of research has criticized the production function methodology utilized by 
most education researchers since exam performance on math, science, and reading is only one 
desired outcome of the educational system (Bishop, 2006). Socialization, personal edification, 
and career guidance are other important schooling goals, as evidenced by the fact that 
mathematics only account for 14% of class time in American schools. Music, personal use, and 
vocational courses account for a large proportion of total student credits but are generally 
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disregarded by educational researchers (NCES, Digest of Education Statistics 2002, Table 139). 
However, the PISA distinguishes itself from other international surveys by addressing the 
concerns of these critics. “The PISA aims to define each domain not merely in terms of mastery 
of the school curriculum, but in terms of important knowledge and skills needed in adult life” 
(Fuchs & Woessmann, 2004). Rather than simply testing the students’ ability to solve math or 
science problems, it tests more generally for cognitive ability and human capital. The PISA 
survey is used in this thesis because of its focus on real-world applications and its thorough 
inclusion of parental variables. 
 
3. Data  
The data used for this analysis includes the three most recent iterations of the PISA survey 
(i.e. 2006, 2009, and 2012) along with relevant macroeconomic data from the OECD. The 
dataset is limited to countries that have opted into the PISA Parental Questionnaire at least once 
(the Parental Questionnaire was first introduced in 2006) totaling over 300,000 students from 22 
different countries. Because the PISA survey differs considerably between years, a core set of 
survey items is selected in order to run identical regressions for each time period. This list 
includes a subset of variables from the student, parent, and school questionnaires. The full list 
can be found in the Appendix.  
The PISA Parental Questionnaire includes a series of seven Likert-type items pertaining to 
parental perceptions of school quality. I also compute an eighth item representing the average 
value of these seven parental items for each observation. Altogether, these eight items serve as 
measures of parental attitudes in my analysis. The figure below displays them as they are seen in 
the PISA Parental Questionnaire. 
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One important detail is that these items are reversed-coded, meaning that an increase in each 
variable represents a decrease in parental satisfaction. They will henceforth be referred to as 
Parental Dissatisfaction variables. Regressions involving Parental Dissatisfaction are rerun using 
each of these variables because it is unclear which of them weighs most heavily in the minds of 
the parents.  10 
 
SECTION C: ATTITUDES TO CHILD’S SCHOOL 
 
 PA09 
Q We are interested in what you think about your child’s school. 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements? 
 (Please tick only one box in each row.) 
  
Strongly 
agree Agree Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
a) Most of my child’s school teachers 
seem competent and dedicated.  1 2 3 4 
b) Standards of achievement are high in 
my child’s school.  1 2 3 4 
c) I am happy with the content taught 
and the instructional methods used in 
my child’s school.  
1 2 3 4 
d) I am satisfied with the disciplinary 
atmosphere in my child’s school.  1 2 3 4 
e) My child’s progress is carefully 
monitored by the school.  1 2 3 4 
f) My child’s school provides regular 
and useful information on my child’s 
progress.  
1 2 3 4 
g) My child’s school does a good job in 
educating students.  1 2 3 4 
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I make two noteworthy assumptions about these Parental Dissatisfaction variables in the 
analysis. My first assumption is that parental behaviors and parental attitudes are essentially the 
same thing. Doepke and Zilibotti (2014) predict that parental behaviors become more severe as 
the economic returns to student achievement rise. However, I am testing this theory using 
parental attitude items because I simply do not have any data relating directly to parental 
behavior.  
My second assumption is that the Parental Dissatisfaction variables are continuous. In other 
words, I make the assumption that points on the four-point Likert scale are equidistant from one 
another in order to simplify the analysis. 
To measure the economic returns to student achievement, I utilize Wage Premium data from 
the OECD. The Wage Premium is a ratio describing the economic returns (in terms of hourly 
wages) to educational attainment. Educational systems vary by countries, so the OECD uses an 
international classification of educational attainment called the International Standard 
Classification of Education (ISCED). These classifications are displayed in the following figure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Level Description
0 pre%primary
1 primary
2 lower/secondary
3 upper/secondary
4 post%secondary/non%tertiary
5 first/stage/of/tertiary
6 second/stage/of/tertiary
ISCED2Levels
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For this analysis, the Wage Premium is computed as a ratio of the average wage of 
workers who have achieved tertiary education (ISCED levels 5 and 6) to the average wage of 
workers who have achieved up to an upper secondary education (ISCED levels 0 through 3). The 
figure below illustrates the wage premium for each country in the data set. The larger the Wage 
Premium is, the larger the economic returns to student achievement are in that country. For 
example, the Wage Premium is 1.49 in Belgium in 2006. This means that the average wages of 
workers with a tertiary education is 1.49 times that of workers who have with less than an upper 
secondary education. One noteworthy trend in this table is that the Wage Premium has 
diminished in seven of ten countries between 2006 and 2012.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 2006 2009 2012
Belgium 1.49 1.44 1.42
Denmark 1.52 1.51 1.58
Hungary 2.95 2.88 2.86
Germany 1.77 1.86 1.92
Italy 2.04 1.90 1.91
Korea 2.19 2.17 2.07
Luxembourg 2.07 2.45 2.40
NewCZealand 1.56 1.44 1.51
Poland 2.06 2.01 2.02
Portugal 2.64 2.49 2.43
Wage1Premium
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The final variable of interest is Student Achievement. For each subject, the PISA survey asks 
students to complete a subset of questions from a large question bank. This means that students 
from around the world take non-identical tests, and their results are therefore not directly 
comparable. To resolve this, PISA includes 5 Plausible Values for each subject, estimating a 
score that each student likely would have achieved if they had completed the full set of 
questions. These values are based on the Rasch Model (OECD, 2009). Although PISA 
recommends running each regression five times for each subject (once for each Plausible Value) 
and averaging the results, this thesis simply uses the first set of Plausible Values since results do 
not change substantially using PISA’s recommended method. The following table compares 
national averages in math, science, and reading scores across each survey year. Included 
countries participated in the Parental Questionnaire at least once between 2006 and 2012. 
 
 Because collecting a true random sample would be prohibitively expensive, PISA uses a 
two-stage sampling design to select observations. Schools within each country are selected, and 
Math Science Reading Math Science Reading Math- Science Reading
Belgium *** *** *** *** *** *** 549 537 535
Denmark 512 495 494 489 483 482 *** *** ***
Hungary *** *** *** 496 508 499 487 504 498
Germany 504 516 496 511 519 496 532 542 527
Italy 474 487 477 490 496 491 496 505 501
Korea 547 522 555 549 539 541 554 538 536
Luxembourg 491 487 480 *** *** *** *** *** ***
New-Zealand 523 532 523 523 535 523 *** *** ***
Poland 500 503 513 499 512 505 *** *** ***
Portugal 470 479 477 487 492 489 491 492 492
Mean%Test%Scores
Country
201220092006
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then students within those schools are selected. The result is that certain schools and students 
have a greater probability of being sampled, so it is necessary to weight each observation by the 
inverse of the probability of being selected. For this analysis, the student weights provided by 
PISA are normalized to insure that the sum of the weights equals the total number of 
observations in the data set. 
 
4. Conceptual Framework 
This section describes the conceptual roadmap that my statistical analysis will follow. There 
are three key variables (i.e. Wage Premium, Parental Dissatisfaction, and Student Performance) 
and the figure below illustrates their relationship. 
 
Relationship A is the effect of the Wage Premium on Parental Dissatisfaction. This is the key 
relationship of interest because it directly relates to Doepke and Zilibotti’s (2014) theory. 
Relationship B is the effect of Parental Dissatisfaction on Student Achievement, which relates to 
the debate over which parenting style is most effective for rearing high-achieving children. 
Finally, Relationship C is the effect of the Wage Premium on Student Performance, which 
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investigates the responsiveness of students to the economic returns to student achievement in 
terms of standardized test scores.  
I will begin by running an exploratory regression of test scores in math, science, and reading 
on country and time dummies to understand how student are performing across countries and 
across time periods. The ultimate goal of educational economic research is to improve student 
achievement and to develop human capital, so it is important to understand how students are 
performing currently and how student performance has changed over time.  
 Next I will test Relationship A by regressing Parental Dissatisfaction on the Wage Premium. 
According to Doepke and Zilibotti (2014), this relationship should be positive as parental 
attitudes become more severe in response to growth in the economic returns to education. 
Regression A essentially tests whether Doepke and Zilibotti’s theory is empirically supported by 
PISA and OECD data. 
 Next I will test Relationship B by regressing Student Performance on Parental 
Dissatisfaction. In the context of international education, parental attitudes are only relevant to 
the extent that they influence student achievement, so Regression B investigates how much of 
the international variance in student achievement is attributable to parental attitudes. This 
regression will all so shed light on Amy Chua’s theory that “Tiger” parenting results in high-
achieving children. 
Finally, Relationship C connects the previous two relationships by regressing Student 
Performance on the Wage Premium. This model investigates whether growth in the economic 
returns to education incentivizes students to perform well in school. 
 I will conclude by summarizing my results and discussing how this analysis contributes to 
our current understanding of the economics of education.  
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5. Exploratory Regression 
The purpose of the first regression is to compare student performance across countries and 
across time. The regression includes year dummies as well as dummies for the 22 countries that 
have opted into the PISA Parental Questionnaire. The country coefficients are computed relative 
to Hong Kong (the highest achiever) and the year dummies are computed relative to 2006. Only 
the 10 countries for which Wage Premium data exists are includes in the regression output below 
since subsequent regressions will be limited to observations from these 10 countries. The full 
regression output can be found in the Appendix. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Encouragingly, average test scores have increased significantly with time, and students in 
2012 score 18 points higher in mathematics on average than students in 2006. The same trend 
also applies to science and reading scores. Most countries perform similarly in all three subjects, 
Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig.)
(Constant) 547.2 .000 543.2 .000 531.4 .000
Belgium 815.9 .000 821.7 .000 813.5 .000
Denmark 853.8 .000 859.5 .000 848.6 .000
Germany 842.1 .000 826.6 .000 835.3 .000
Hungary 870.1 .000 848.9 .000 845.2 .000
Italy 869.4 .000 854.6 .000 849.4 .000
Korea 86.5 .000 817.9 .000 4.6 .000
Luxembourg 856.7 .000 856.3 .000 850.9 .000
NewIZealand 829.2 .000 813.5 .000 812.0 .000
Poland 852.0 .000 839.5 .000 826.0 .000
Portugal 873.6 .000 862.8 .000 853.6 .000
2009IDummy 9.7 .000 7.6 .000 8.1 .000
2012IDummy 18.0 .000 15.0 .000 17.1 .000
Math Science
Exploratory)Regression
Country
Reading
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but certain countries have a wide performance gap between math, science, and reading. For 
example, Hungary performs 20 points worse in math than in science or reading.  
There is also a clear development effect on student performance, meaning that students from 
highly developed economies (e.g. South Korea, Belgium) generally perform far above students 
from highly underdeveloped economies (e.g. Portugal). As a dramatic example, student from 
Qatar score 185 points below students from Belgium in mathematics on average.  
Subsequent regressions include macroeconomic variables to control as much as possible for 
these development effects and for economic shocks (e.g. the 2008 financial crisis). These 
variables include Real GDP per capita in the test year, annualized Real GDP per capita growth in 
the three years leading up to the test year, and the average unemployment rate in the three years 
leading up to the test year. By controlling for these variables, I can reduce the impact of omitted 
variable bias on my regression output. 
 
6. Regression A: Wage Premium vs. Parental Dissatisfaction  
The next regression investigates the effect of the Wage Premium on Parental Dissatisfaction.  
The model takes the following form: 
 
 
 
The dependent variable D is Parental Dissatisfaction and the main explanatory variable W is the 
Wage Premium. Finally, M, I, H, and S represent vectors of macroeconomic, individual, home, 
and school characteristics respectively. Along with country and year fixed effects, these variables 
are used as controls, but they are not included in the regression output for the sake of clarity. The 
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model is rerun eight times, once with each Parental Dissatisfaction variable. The following table 
displays the Wage Premium coefficient and significance for each of these regressions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Wage Premium coefficient is positive in all eight regressions and statistically significant 
at a 1% confidence level in all but one regression. Interestingly, parental perception of the 
school’s disciplinary climate (Model 4) is most strongly affected by the Wage Premium, 
Model Dependent*Variable
Wage*
Premium*
Beta
Wage*
Premium*
Sig.
1
Most&of&my&child's&school&
teachers&seem&competent&and&
dedicated. .397 .000
2
Standards&of&achievement&are&
high&in&my&child's&school. .105 .185
3
I&am&happy&with&the&content&
taught&and&the&instructional&
methods&used&in&my&child's&
school. .288 .000
4
I&am&satisfied&with&the&
disciplinary&atmosphere&in&my&
child's&school. .732 .000
5
My&child's&progress&is&carefully&
monitored&by&the&school. .254 .001
6
My&child's&school&provides&
regular&and&useful&information&
on&my&child's&progress. .345 .000
7
My&child's&school&does&a&good&
job&in&educating&students. .301 .000
8 Parental&Dissatisfaction&Average .364 .000
Regression*A
a.&Independent&Variable:&Wage&Premium
b.&Full&regression&output&can&be&found&in&the&Appendix
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suggesting that parents tend to become disciplinarians when the Wage Premium increases, as 
predicted by Doepke and Zilibotti (2014).  
The coefficient for Model 4 indicates that a 100% increase in the Wage Premium is 
associated with .732-point increase on the 4-point Parental Dissatisfaction scale when 
extensively controlling for other factors. The average effect (Model 8) is a .364-point increase. 
To put this into perspective, the Wage Premium in Luxembourg rose by just over 1% between 
2006 and 2012. According to Regression A, a 1% in the Wage Premium is associated with a 
.00364-point increase in Parental Dissatisfaction. The relationship is significant and in the 
hypothesized direction, but the effect is not very economically significant. In other words, 
Regression A suggests that the Wage Premium causes parents to become less satisfied with their 
child’s school, but the effect is very slight.  
 
7.  Regression B: Parental Dissatisfaction vs. Student Performance 
The next regression investigates the effect of Parental Dissatisfaction on Student Performance. 
The model takes the following form: 
 
 
 
For each observation there are eight Parental Dissatisfaction variables and three Student 
Performance variables (i.e. math, science, and reading scores). 24 separate regressions are run to 
test for every combination of variables. In other words, math scores are sequentially regressed on 
all eight Parental Dissatisfaction variables, and then the same is done for science and reading 
scores. 
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The following tables display the Parental Dissatisfaction coefficients and significance for 
each of these regressions. For each subject, the coefficient on all but one of the Parental 
Dissatisfaction variables is negative, indicating a negative relationship between Parental 
Dissatisfaction and Student Performance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!Explanatory!Variable Beta Significance
Most%of%my%child's%school%teachers%
seem%competent%and%dedicated. 54.051 .000
Standards%of%achievement%are%high%
in%my%child's%school. 517.554 .000
I%am%happy%with%the%content%taught%
and%the%instructional%methods%used%
in%my%child's%school. 54.085 .000
I%am%satisfied%with%the%disciplinary%
atmosphere%in%my%child's%school. 57.243 .000
My%child's%progress%is%carefully%
monitored%by%the%school. 53.288 .000
My%child's%school%provides%regular%
and%useful%information%on%my%
child's%progress. 1.131 .002
My%child's%school%does%a%good%job%in%
educating%students. 57.957 .000
Parental%Dissatisfaction%Average 512.012 .000
Regression!B!(Reading)
a.%Dependent%Variable:%Reading%scores
b.%Full%regression%output%can%be%found%in%the%Appendix
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!Explanatory!Variable Beta Significance
Most%of%my%child's%school%teachers%
seem%competent%and%dedicated. 53.667 .000
Standards%of%achievement%are%high%
in%my%child's%school. 517.446 .000
I%am%happy%with%the%content%taught%
and%the%instructional%methods%used%
in%my%child's%school. 54.672 .000
I%am%satisfied%with%the%disciplinary%
atmosphere%in%my%child's%school. 56.285 .000
My%child's%progress%is%carefully%
monitored%by%the%school. 52.927 .000
My%child's%school%provides%regular%
and%useful%information%on%my%
child's%progress. 1.834 .000
My%child's%school%does%a%good%job%in%
educating%students. 57.578 .000
Parental%Dissatisfaction%Average 511.016 .000
Regression!B!(Science)
a.%Dependent%Variable:%Science%scores
b.%Full%regression%output%can%be%found%in%the%Appendix
!Explanatory!Variable Beta Significance
Most%of%my%child's%school%teachers%
seem%competent%and%dedicated. 54.431 .000
Standards%of%achievement%are%high%
in%my%child's%school. 518.76 .000
I%am%happy%with%the%content%taught%
and%the%instructional%methods%used%
in%my%child's%school. 54.672 .000
I%am%satisfied%with%the%disciplinary%
atmosphere%in%my%child's%school. 57.174 .000
My%child's%progress%is%carefully%
monitored%by%the%school. 53.853 .000
My%child's%school%provides%regular%
and%useful%information%on%my%
child's%progress. .900 .016
My%child's%school%does%a%good%job%in%
educating%students. 58.727 .000
Parental%Dissatisfaction%Average 513.13 .000
Regression!B!(Math)
a.%Dependent%Variable:%Math%scores
b.%Full%regression%output%can%be%found%in%the%Appendix
	   20	  
There are several possible explanations for this negative relationship. The first 
explanation is that “helicopter parenting” is simply ineffective and causes students to perform 
poorly. However, this explanation is unlikely because it contradicts prior studies (e.g. Darling & 
Steinberg, 1993). The more likely explanation for the negative relationship is reverse causality. 
Rather than Parental Dissatisfaction influencing Student Performance, Student Performance 
influences Parental Dissatisfaction (i.e. the better a student performs in school, the happier 
parents are with that school, and vice versa). Controlling for past student performance would be 
useful for resolving this reverse causality problem, but unfortunately this is not possible with the 
PISA data. I can conclude that Student Achievement negatively influences Parental 
Dissatisfaction, but I can make no such conclusion about the effect of Parental Dissatisfaction on 
Student Achievement. 
 
8. Regression C: Wage Premium vs. Student Performance 
The final regression tests for the effect of the Wage Premium on Student Performance. If the 
economic returns to student achievement rise, students will have greater incentive to perform 
well in school and to achieve higher levels of education. This model investigates whether 
students respond to these incentives in terms of standardized test scores. It takes the following 
form: 
 
 
 
The model is identical to Regression B except it does not control for Parental Dissatisfaction. 
The results from this regression are summarized in the following table. 
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Using math or science as the dependent variable, the Wage Premium coefficient is positive, 
indicating that students respond positively to rising economic returns to achievement. However, 
the opposite is true when using reading scores as the dependent variable. One explanation for 
these results is that the economic returns to student achievement are greater in STEM-related 
fields, so students focus their efforts on math and science while neglecting other subjects. In the 
United States, there is a 26% salary premium for entry-level STEM jobs relative to entry-level 
non-STEM jobs (Burning Glass, 2014), so it makes economic sense for students to focus on 
STEM subjects. This explanation accounts for the fact that the math and science coefficients are 
positive while the reading coefficient is negative. However, further research is necessary to 
determine whether this explanation is valid. 
 
9. Conclusion 
     Now that my results have been presented, I will return to my conceptual roadmap to illustrate 
my findings. 
!Dependent!Variable Wage!Premium!Beta Wage!Premium!Significance
Math%Scores 9.274 .314
Science%Scores 38.862 .000
Reading%Scores ;22.601 .014
Regression!C!
	   22	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     For Relationship A, I found evidence that the Wage Premium positively influences Parental 
Dissatisfaction. This finding empirically supports Doepke and Zilibotti’s (2014) economic 
theory, and it emphasizes the fact that parenting styles aren’t simply cultural or behavioral traits; 
parenting styles are also a rational response to economic conditions. 
     For Relationship B, I was unable to conclude whether or not Parental Dissatisfaction 
influences Student Performance. However, I found evidence for the opposite effect (i.e. that 
Student Performance negatively influences Parental Dissatisfaction). In other words, when 
students perform better in school, parents become more satisfied with their child’s school. It 
would be useful to control for past student performance in order to eliminate this reverse 
causality, but the PISA data does not permit such an analysis. 
     For Relationship C, I found a positive effect of the Wage Premium on math and science 
scores and a negative effect of the Wage Premium on reading scores. I argued that these results 
might be explained by the fact that the economic returns to student achievement are greater for 
Wage	  Premium	  
Parental	  Dissatisfaction	  
Student	  Performance	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STEM subjects (i.e. math and science), so students focus on them at the expense of other 
subjects. This would be a fascinating question to address in future studies. 
     This thesis provides two main lasting contributions. The first contribution is empirical support 
for Doepke and Zilibotti’s (2014) economic theory. Economic inequality in the United States has 
grown considerably since the 1970s (Moser, 2014) and “Helicopter parenting” has become more 
prevalent during that time. My research provides an empirical explanation for this behavior. 
Rather than relying on economic theory or basic correlations, my thesis uses a rich dataset and 
multivariate regression analysis to further our understanding of the determinants of parenting 
styles and student achievement. 
     The second contribution of my thesis is its unique and novel use of the PISA data. My 
research is the first to use parental attitude items from the PISA Parental Questionnaire as 
outcome variables, and it is the first to use the Wage Premium as an explanatory variable in a 
PISA study. I hope that this thesis will serve as a small step towards improving international 
educational outcomes. 
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Variable Type Variable Type
Student'
Achievement Ordinal
Quality'of'school'
educational'resources Continuous
Wage'premium Continuous Student;Teacher'ratio Continuous
Real'GDP/Capita'
(in'thousands) Continuous
Shortage'of'teaching'
staff Continuous
GDP'Growth Continuous Village Dummy
Unemployment Continuous Small'Town Dummy
Student'age
Continuous Town' Dummy
Index'of'
economic,'
social,and'cultural'
status Continuous City Dummy
Home'educational'
resources Continuous Private'School Dummy
Home'possessions Continuous Belgium Dummy
Female Dummy Germany Dummy
Highest'parental'
education'level Ordinal Denmark Dummy
Highest'parental'
occupation' Ordinal Hungary Dummy
Immigration'
Status Dummy Korea Dummy
Ratio'of'school'
PCs'connected'to'
web'and'#'of'PCs Continuous Luxembourg Dummy
Proportion'of'girls'
at'school Continuous New'Zealand Dummy
Proportion'of'
certified'teachers Continuous Poland Dummy
Proportion'of'
teachers'with'
ISCED'5A Continuous Portugal Dummy
Index'of'school'
responsibility'for'
curriculum'and'
assessment Continuos 2009'Dummy Dummy
Index'of'school'
responsibility'for'
resource'
allocation Continuous 2012'Dummy Dummy
CONTINUEDVariable2List
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Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig.)
(Constant) 547.2 .000 543.2 .000 531.4 .000
20092Dummy 9.7 .000 7.6 .000 8.1 .000
20122Dummy 18.0 .000 15.0 .000 17.1 .000
Belgium >15.9 .000 >21.7 .000 >13.5 .000
Bulgaria >130.0 .000 >103.8 .000 >124.2 .000
Chile >124.8 .000 >94.7 .000 >85.7 .000
Columbia >173.8 .000 >151.7 .000 >140.5 .000
Croatia >89.5 .000 >59.6 .000 >59.7 .000
Denmark >53.8 .000 >59.5 .000 >48.6 .000
Germany >42.1 .000 >26.6 .000 >35.3 .000
Hungary >70.1 .000 >48.9 .000 >45.2 .000
Iceland >42.1 .000 >52.4 .000 >47.1 .000
Italy >69.4 .000 >54.6 .000 >49.4 .000
Korea >6.5 .000 >17.9 .000 4.6 .000
Lithuania >80.1 .000 >59.2 .000 >70.6 .000
Luxembourg >56.7 .000 >56.3 .000 >50.9 .000
Macao >27.4 .000 >37.2 .000 >44.7 .000
Mexico >146.1 .000 >138.0 .000 >118.4 .000
New2Zealand >29.2 .000 >13.5 .000 >12.0 .000
Panama >195.8 .000 >175.0 .000 >162.6 .000
Poland >52.0 .000 >39.5 .000 >26.0 .000
Portugal >73.6 .000 >62.8 .000 >53.6 .000
Qatar >206.0 .000 >181.9 .000 >189.4 .000
Turkey >119.2 .000 >115.3 .000 >77.9 .000
Exploratory)Regression)(Complete)
Country
Math Science Reading
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Variable Beta Std.-Error Sig. Variable Beta Std.-Error Sig.
(Constant) 1.956 .156 .000
Index3of3school3
responsibility3for3
resource3allocation >.020 .003 .000
Wage3Premium .364 .057 .000
Quality3of3school3
educational3
resources >2.189E>5 .000 .727
Math3Score .000 .000 .000
Student>Teacher3
ratio .000 .000 .642
Science3Score .000 .000 .001
Shortage3of3teaching3
staff 9.001E>5 .000 .130
Reading3Score .000 .000 .000 Village >.039 .008 .000
Real3GDP/Capita3
(in3thousands) >.014 .002 .000 Small3Town >.014 .006 .021
GDP3Growth .002 .004 .671 Town3 >.019 .005 .001
Unemployment >.006 .002 .013 City >.031 .005 .000
Student3age >.004 .005 .375 Private3School >.172 .005 .000
Index3of3
economic,3 .022 .004 .000 Belgium .373 .031 .000
Home3
educational3
resources .000 .000 .182 Germany .344 .016 .000
Home3
possessions 7.698E>5 .000 .588 Denmark .348 .027 .000
Female .022 .003 .000 Hungary >.478 .055 .000
Highest3parental3
education3level .000 .002 .836 Korea .186 .019 .000
Highest3parental3
occupation3 >5.939E>5 .000 .640 Luxembourg .652 .060 .000
Immigration3
Status >.015 .004 .000 New3Zealand .081 .036 .023
Ratio3of3school3
PCs3connected3to3
web3and3#3of3PCs >.019 .010 .044 Poland >.261 .039 .000
Proportion3of3
girls3at3school .000 .000 .001 Portugal >.298 .033 .000
Proportion3of3
certified3teachers .028 .008 .001 20093Dummy .031 .012 .009
Proportion3of3
teachers3with3
ISCED35A .016 .006 .008 20123Dummy .034 .008 .000
Regression-A-(Complete) CONTINUED
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Variable Beta Std.-Error Sig. Variable Beta Std.-Error Sig.
(Constant) 309.935 28.868 .000
Quality6of6school6
educational6
resources .052 .012 .000
Parental6
Dissatisfaction @13.133 .575 .000
Student@Teacher6
ratio 3.562 .082 .000
Wage6premium @5.651 10.550 .592
Shortage6of6
teaching6staff @.063 .011 .000
Real6GDP/Capita6
(in6thousands) .038 .290 .896 Village @12.078 1.569 .000
GDP6Growth @2.322 .794 .003 Small6Town @5.841 1.107 .000
Unemployment @.590 .452 .192 Town6 1.210 1.018 .235
Student6age 13.821 .888 .000 City .894 .998 .370
Index6of6
economic,6
social,and6cultural6
status 40.740 .708 .000 Private6School 1.220 .985 .215
Home6educational6
resources @.072 .018 .000 Belgium 52.588 5.759 .000
Home6possessions .068 .026 .010 Germany .921 3.023 .761
Female @19.623 .532 .000 Denmark @.712 4.961 .886
Highest6parental6
education6level @7.858 .341 .000 Hungary .184 10.273 .986
Highest6parental6
occupation6 @.198 .024 .000 Korea 45.232 3.512 .000
Immigration6
Status @12.226 .670 .000 Luxembourg 8.452 11.108 .447
Ratio6of6school6
PCs6connected6to6
web6and6#6of6PCs 25.941 1.763 .000 New6Zealand 25.987 6.596 .000
Proportion6of6girls6
at6school .077 .020 .000 Poland 40.006 7.131 .000
Proportion6of6
certified6teachers 5.726 1.528 .000 Portugal 9.340 6.188 .131
Proportion6of6
teachers6with6
ISCED65A 8.762 1.081 .000 20096Dummy @.025 2.162 .991
Index6of6school6
responsibility6for6
curriculum6and6
assessment @3.996 0.312 0 20126Dummy 7.733 1.429 .000
Index6of6school6
responsibility6for6
resource6
allocation @7.18 0.505 0.16
Regression-B-(Math) CONTINUED
Adjusted6R26=6.21866666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666
N6=6103,425
a.6Dependent6Variable:6Math6Scores
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Variable Beta Std.-Error Sig. Variable Beta Std.-Error Sig.
(Constant) 141.953 28.749 .000
Quality8of8school8
educational8
resources .050 .012 .000
Parental8
Dissatisfaction A11.016 .572 .000
StudentATeacher8
ratio 3.391 .082 .000
Wage8premium 33.451 10.506 .001
Shortage8of8
teaching8staff A.063 .011 .000
Real8GDP/Capita8
(in8thousands) 1.683 .289 .000 Village A7.621 1.562 .000
GDP8Growth A.233 .791 .768 Small8Town A4.967 1.103 .000
Unemployment .353 .450 .433 Town8 3.013 1.014 .003
Student8age 15.615 .885 .000 City 3.346 .994 .001
Index8of8
economic,8
social,and8cultural8
status 37.145 .705 .000 Private8School 1.328 .981 .176
Home8educational8
resources A.053 .018 .003 Belgium 38.325 5.735 .000
Home8possessions .033 .026 .212 Germany A3.117 3.011 .301
Female A7.210 .530 .000 Denmark A3.602 4.941 .466
Highest8parental8
education8level A5.808 .340 .000 Hungary A18.659 10.231 .068
Highest8parental8
occupation8 A.154 .023 .000 Korea 7.314 3.498 .037
Immigration8
Status A18.572 .667 .000 Luxembourg A72.295 11.063 .000
Ratio8of8school8
PCs8connected8to8
web8and8#8of8PCs 27.364 1.756 .000 New8Zealand 58.105 6.569 .000
Proportion8of8girls8
at8school .161 .020 .000 Poland 34.785 7.102 .000
Proportion8of8
certified8teachers 5.469 1.522 .000 Portugal A9.488 6.162 .124
Proportion8of8
teachers8with8
ISCED85A 8.718 1.077 .000 20098Dummy 5.440 2.153 .012
Index8of8school8
responsibility8for8
curriculum8and8
assessment A4.399 .311 .000 20128Dummy 12.441 1.423 .000
Index8of8school8
responsibility8for8
resource8
allocation A.650 .503 .197
Regression-B-(Science) CONTINUED
Adjusted8R28=8.19088888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888
N8=8103,425
a.8Dependent8Variable:8Science8Scores
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Variable Beta Std.-Error Sig. Variable Beta Std.-Error Sig.
(Constant) 459.471 28.600 .000
Quality8of8school8
educational8
resources .050 .012 .000
Parental8
Dissatisfaction A12.012 .569 .000
StudentATeacher8
ratio 3.773 .082 .000
Wage8premium A41.129 10.452 .000
Shortage8of8
teaching8staff A.061 .011 .000
Real8GDP/Capita8
(in8thousands) A3.749 .287 .000 Village A19.761 1.554 .000
GDP8Growth 2.022 .787 .010 Small8Town A11.178 1.097 .000
Unemployment A.209 .448 .641 Town8 A1.445 1.008 .152
Student8age 13.679 .880 .000 City A.273 .989 .783
Index8of8
economic,8
social,and8cultural8
status 39.034 .702 .000 Private8School 3.136 .975 .001
Home8educational8
resources A.059 .018 .001 Belgium 35.611 5.705 .000
Home8possessions .020 .026 .433 Germany A10.515 2.995 .000
Female 32.109 .527 .000 Denmark A3.024 4.915 .538
Highest8parental8
education8level A6.672 .338 .000 Hungary A10.979 10.178 .281
Highest8parental8
occupation8 A.186 .023 .000 Korea 17.047 3.479 .000
Immigration8
Status A18.020 .663 .000 Luxembourg 142.237 11.005 .000
Ratio8of8school8
PCs8connected8to8
web8and8#8of8PCs 25.252 1.747 .000 New8Zealand A10.234 6.535 .117
Proportion8of8girls8
at8school .248 .019 .000 Poland A28.982 7.065 .000
Proportion8of8
certified8teachers 13.984 1.514 .000 Portugal 2.293 6.130 .708
Proportion8of8
teachers8with8
ISCED85A 11.822 1.071 .000 20098Dummy A8.719 2.142 .000
Index8of8school8
responsibility8for8
curriculum8and8
assessment A3.753 .310 .000 20128Dummy .244 1.415 .863
Index8of8school8
responsibility8for8
resource8
allocation A.806 .501 .107
Regression-B-(Reading) CONTINUED
Adjusted8R28=8.240888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888
N8=8103,425
a.8Dependent8Variable:8Reading8Scores
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Variable Beta Std.-Error Sig. Variable Beta Std.-Error Sig.
(Constant) 248.024 25.364 .000
Quality6of6school6
educational6
resources .053 .010 .000
Wage6premium 9.274 9.212 .314
StudentETeacher6
ratio 3.640 .077 .000
Real6GDP/Capita6
(in6thousands) E.017 .283 .953
Shortage6of6
teaching6staff E.059 .009 .000
GDP6Growth E3.502 .694 .000 Village E10.267 1.357 .000
Unemployment 1.119 .261 .000 Small6Town E4.352 1.015 .000
Student6age 13.491 .820 .000 Town6 2.346 .934 .012
Index6of6
economic,6
social,and6cultural6
status 43.031 .624 .000 City 1.638 .926 .077
Home6educational6
resources E.063 .015 .000 Private6School 4.128 .923 .000
Home6possessions .057 .024 .017 Belgium 60.936 5.032 .000
Female E18.511 .489 .000 Germany E6.137 2.640 .020
Highest6parental6
education6level E8.137 .307 .000 Denmark E.155 4.197 .971
Highest6parental6
occupation6 E.258 .021 .000 Hungary E14.289 9.129 .118
Immigration6
Status E14.102 .582 .000 Korea 52.625 2.773 .000
Ratio6of6school6
PCs6connected6to6
web6and6#6of6PCs 27.459 1.639 .000 Luxembourg 16.894 10.830 .119
Proportion6of6girls6
at6school .098 .018 .000 New6Zealand 33.748 5.415 .000
Proportion6of6
certified6teachers 5.469 1.422 .000 Poland 27.297 6.221 .000
Proportion6of6
teachers6with6
ISCED65A 7.991 .971 .000 Portugal .078 5.463 .989
Index6of6school6
responsibility6for6
curriculum6and6
assessment E3.527 .290 .000 20096Dummy E1.673 1.981 .398
Index6of6school6
responsibility6for6
resource6
allocation .143 .465 .759 20126Dummy 8.794 1.253 .000
Regression-C-(Math) CONTINUED
Adjusted6R26=6.21666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666
N6=6124,629
a.6Dependent6Variable:6Math6Scores
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Variable Beta Std.-Error Sig. Variable Beta Std.-Error Sig.
(Constant) 109.379 25.352 .000
Quality6of6school6
educational6
resources .046 .010 .000
Wage6premium 38.862 9.207 .000
StudentETeacher6
ratio 3.533 .077 .000
Real6GDP/Capita6
(in6thousands) 1.466 .283 .000
Shortage6of6
teaching6staff E.057 .009 .000
GDP6Growth E.801 .693 .248 Village E4.801 1.357 .000
Unemployment 1.233 .261 .000 Small6Town E2.475 1.014 .015
Student6age 15.460 .819 .000 Town6 4.620 .934 .000
Index6of6
economic,6
social,and6cultural6
status 39.871 .624 .000 City 4.419 .926 .000
Home6educational6
resources E.052 .015 .001 Private6School 4.012 .923 .000
Home6possessions .025 .024 .298 Belgium 41.943 5.029 .000
Female E5.959 .489 .000 Germany E10.282 2.638 .000
Highest6parental6
education6level E6.171 .307 .000 Denmark E7.822 4.195 .062
Highest6parental6
occupation6 E.217 .021 .000 Hungary E24.490 9.125 .007
Immigration6
Status E20.394 .582 .000 Korea 11.188 2.772 .000
Ratio6of6school6
PCs6connected6to6
web6and6#6of6PCs 29.409 1.638 .000 Luxembourg E61.717 10.825 .000
Proportion6of6girls6
at6school .180 .018 .000 New6Zealand 53.856 5.413 .000
Proportion6of6
certified6teachers 4.858 1.422 .001 Poland 26.619 6.218 .000
Proportion6of6
teachers6with6
ISCED65A 8.659 .970 .000 Portugal E13.488 5.460 .014
Index6of6school6
responsibility6for6
curriculum6and6
assessment E4.206 .290 .000 20096Dummy 4.232 1.980 .033
Index6of6school6
responsibility6for6
resource6
allocation .128 .465 .783 20126Dummy 14.348 1.252 .000
Regression-C-(Science) CONTINUED
Adjusted6R26=6.193666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666
N6=6124,629
a.6Dependent6Variable:6Science6Scores
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Variable Beta Std.-Error Sig. Variable Beta Std.-Error Sig.
(Constant) 387.741 25.252 .000
Quality7of7school7
educational7
resources .042 .010 .000
Wage7premium B22.601 9.171 .014
StudentBTeacher7
ratio 3.879 .077 .000
Real7GDP/Capita7
(in7thousands) B3.899 .282 .000
Shortage7of7
teaching7staff B.049 .009 .000
GDP7Growth 1.028 .691 .137 Village B16.322 1.351 .000
Unemployment 1.056 .260 .000 Small7Town B8.895 1.010 .000
Student7age 13.866 .816 .000 Town7 .298 .930 .749
Index7of7
economic,7
social,and7cultural7
status 41.788 .622 .000 City .641 .922 .487
Home7educational7
resources B.056 .015 .000 Private7School 5.775 .919 .000
Home7possessions .014 .024 .560 Belgium 46.404 5.009 .000
Female 33.874 .487 .000 Germany B15.538 2.628 .000
Highest7parental7
education7level B7.152 .306 .000 Denmark .340 4.178 .935
Highest7parental7
occupation7 B.250 .021 .000 Hungary B28.808 9.089 .002
Immigration7
Status B19.551 .580 .000 Korea 22.212 2.761 .000
Ratio7of7school7
PCs7connected7to7
web7and7#7of7PCs 28.284 1.632 .000 Luxembourg 152.511 10.782 .000
Proportion7of7girls7
at7school .262 .018 .000 New7Zealand B4.045 5.391 .453
Proportion7of7
certified7teachers 12.651 1.416 .000 Poland B39.013 6.194 .000
Proportion7of7
teachers7with7
ISCED75A 11.878 .966 .000 Portugal B8.541 1.972 .000
Index7of7school7
responsibility7for7
curriculum7and7
assessment B3.434 .288 .000 20097Dummy B8.541 1.972 .000
Index7of7school7
responsibility7for7
resource7
allocation B.107 .463 .817 20127Dummy 3.190 1.247 .011
Regression-C-(Reading) CONTINUED
Adjusted7R27=7.245777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777
N7=7124,629
a.7Dependent7Variable:7Reading7Scores
